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Abstract
U.S. welfare and tax policies targeting single mothers were transformed over a decade ago.
What was the impact on single mothers’ happiness? Using data from the General Social Survey,
difference in difference estimators are calculated. The results appear to indicate that the package of
welfare and tax policy changes increased happiness. The results are largely consistent across three
comparison groups and robust to various specification checks. This research nicely complements
the literature by examining the impact of the welfare and tax policy changes on a novel outcome
measure, self-reported happiness.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
U.S. welfare and tax policies that target single mothers have been profoundly 
altered over the last two decades.  The changes have been fundamental and 
presumably life altering for poor single mothers.  A substantial empirical 
literature has developed to investigate the resulting changes in welfare use, 
employment, earnings, consumption, family structure, health, and child welfare 
(for example, Bitler and Hoynes, 2007; Blank, 2002; Grogger and Karoly, 2005; 
Meyer and Rosenbaum 2001; Meyer and Sullivan, 2008; and Moffitt, 2003). 
One important outcome, however, has not been studied—the impact on 
subjective well-being (SWB).  Prior to the changes, single mothers consistently 
reported below average happiness.  Moreover, there are reasons to believe the 
changes may have affected single mothers’ SWB.  For example, basic 
microeconomic theory predicts that work requirements and time limits, key 
components of welfare reform, should reduce the utility of those on welfare since 
(i) hours worked generally enters one’s utility function negatively and (ii) time 
limits reduce one’s choice set.  Thus, without an offsetting increase in 
consumption, the changes may have reduced the utility of an already unhappy 
group. 
Meyer and Sullivan (2008) study the material well-being of single 
mothers before and after welfare reform.  They find that total consumption 
increased between 1993 and 2003 for single mothers in the bottom consumption 
quintiles with housing and transportation spending accounting for most of the 
increase.  Meyer and Sullivan also find that the consumption of leisure fell 
sharply for single mothers in the bottom half of the consumption distribution.  
They estimate that for each hour of lost leisure time, non-leisure-time 
consumption increased by an average of three dollars.  Meyer and Sullivan posit 
that welfare reform reduced well-being if the value of lost leisure time is greater 
than three dollars per hour. 
Importantly, Meyer and Sullivan are limited to estimating the reform’s 
impact on an economic indicator—consumption—and extrapolating a conditional 
argument regarding its impact on overall well-being.  Further, recent research has 
shown that material well-being may not be a good measure of overall well-being.  
Diener and Seligman (2008) report that, “there are distressingly large, measurable 
slippages between economic indicators and well-being.”  Thus, the impact of the 
welfare and tax policy changes on SWB cannot necessarily be discerned from the 
extant literature. 
An alternative measure of well-being increasingly used by economists is 
self-reported happiness (Kahneman and Krueger, 2006).  In this paper, the use of 
such measures is extended to the evaluation of welfare and tax policy changes.  
Specifically, the impact of the changes on self-reported happiness is estimated 
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using a difference-in-difference estimator and data from the General Social 
Survey.  The results appear to indicate that the changes increased—and certainly 
did not decrease—happiness.  The paper unfolds as follows: the next section 
provides a brief overview of the relevant literature; the third section discusses the 
empirical implementation; and the fourth and fifth sections present and discuss 
the results. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The first federally funded welfare program—initially known as the Aid to 
Dependent Children program and subsequently renamed the Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) program—was established as part of the Social 
Security Act of 1935.  The initial objective was to support single mothers so that 
they did not have to work outside the home (Grogger and Karoly, 2005).  In the 
ensuing decades, as the labor force participation rate of mothers dramatically 
increased, the initial objective became obsolete.  This change in conjunction with 
ballooning caseloads led to the establishment of the welfare reform movement in 
the 1960s.  A primary goal was to move recipients from welfare to work. 
In 1962, the federal government was given authority to waive AFDC 
policies so states could implement pilot projects intended to make welfare 
programs more effective (Grogger and Karoly, 2005).  Pilot projects had to be 
cost neutral and rigorously evaluated.  At first, few states implemented “waiver” 
reforms.  However, starting in 1987, the number of waiver reforms began to 
increase.  For example, 30 waiver reforms were approved between 1987 and 
1992, and 83 were approved between 1992 and 1996.  In the latter period, 43 
states plus the District of Columbia received approval for one or more reforms; 29 
of these reforms were statewide (no statewide reforms were approved in the prior 
period).  The reforms included a wide range of AFDC program changes, for 
example, financial work incentives, work requirements, sanctions for non-
compliance with program requirements, time limits, and transitional Medicaid and 
childcare benefits. 
This period of policy experimentation culminated in 1996 with the passage 
of The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA).  PRWORA eliminated the AFDC program and replaced it with the 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Family (TANF) program.  In contrast to AFDC, 
TANF included work requirements, a five-year lifetime time limit, and incentives 
to reduce illegitimate births and single-parent households (Blank, 2002).  
PRWORA also increased the availability of work supports, increasing childcare 
subsidies and transitional Medicaid benefits.1 
1 For a more detailed discussion of welfare reform see Grogger and Karoly (2005). 
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During the same period, additional important changes were made to 
programs that target poor single mothers: the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), 
Medicaid, job training, and subsidized childcare.  For example, the EITC was 
increased repeatedly between 1984 and 1996 with the largest increases occurring 
between 1993 and 1996.  Specifically, the phase-in rate, phase-in range, and 
phase-out range were increased in 1985, 1987, and in each year between 1991 and 
1996 (Holz and Schulz, 2003).  During this period the maximum credit that a 
single mother with two children could receive increased from $500 in 1984 to 
$3,556 in 1996.  In total, EITC credits grew fifteen-fold during this period, from 
$1.6 billion in 1984 to $25.1 billion in 1996 (Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2000). 
Medicaid eligibility was expanded during this period as well.  It was 
delinked from AFDC eligibility and progressively extended to low-income 
pregnant women and children (Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2000).  For example, 
states were permitted to cover children ages two and under in families with 
income below the federal poverty line starting in 1987; and states were required to 
cover all children ages five and under in families with income below 133% of the 
federal poverty line starting in 1990.  Additionally, some states extended coverage 
further using their own funds.  In 1997, the State Children’s Health Insurance 
Program (SCHIP) was created, providing medical coverage for pregnant women 
and children in families with income too high to qualify for Medicaid, but too low 
to purchase private medical insurance (Center for Medicare and Medicaid, 2011).  
By 2008, there were over 7 million children covered by CHIP (SCHIP was 
renamed CHIP, the Children’s Health Insurance Program).  Finally, expenditures 
on job training and childcare grew dramatically during this period, from a little 
over $100 million (combined) in 1984 to over $650 million in 1996 (Meyer and 
Rosenbaum, 2000).2 
In summary, the welfare and tax policy changes described above were 
largely designed to increase the labor force participation of single mothers.  A 
vast literature developed to identify the resulting changes in welfare use, 
employment, earnings, consumption, health, family structure, and child welfare 
(for example, Blank, 2002; Eissa and Liebman, 1996; Grogger and Karoly, 2005; 
Moffitt, 2003; and Meyer and Sullivan, 2000).  The findings appear to indicate 
that, at least in the short run, the changes had the intended effect, reducing welfare 
use and increasing employment.  Further, single mothers’ consumption and health 
do not appear to have been compromised in the process (Meyer and Sullivan, 
2008; and Kaestner and Tarlov, 2006).  While some questions remain, including 
what role the robust economy played (Blank, 2002), it appears that the changes 
were successful, at least from the government’s perspective. 
                                                      
2 For a detailed discussion of the changes between 1984 and 1996 see Meyer and Rosenbaum 
(2000). 
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In contrast, the situation may appear quite different to single mothers.  For 
example, there are several reasons to believe the changes reduced single mothers’ 
SWB.  As discussed previously, the imposition of work requirements and time 
limits should reduce a recipient’s utility.  Further, having to work when one is a 
single mother presumably creates additional life stressors that may reduce well-
being—arranging childcare and managing a household solo while working.  
Conversely, there are reasons to believe the changes may have increased single 
mothers’ SWB.  For example, it has been shown that individuals take pleasure 
from working even in mundane jobs (Diener and Seligman, 2008).  Further, there 
is a stigma (cost) associated with being on welfare (Moffitt, 1983).  This cost is 
presumably mitigated or eliminated if one exits welfare.  Finally, time limits may 
act as a commitment device that help individuals with self-control problems exit 
welfare (for a discussion of commitment devices see DellaVigna, 2009). 
In summary, one cannot exclude a priori either of the following: (i) that 
the changes decreased SWB, or (ii) that they increased it.  Thus, one is left with 
an empirical question, about which the literature has been interestingly silent.  For 
example, of the cited reviews, only Grogger and Karoly (2005) vaguely suggests 
such an investigation: the last sentence of chapter seven states, “further research 
on broader measures of well-being would usefully complement efforts that have 
focused on traditional, if limited, measures of income.” 
A growing body of research, however, suggests that it would be valuable 
and feasible to conduct such an investigation.  Four reasons that it is worthwhile 
follow.  First, economists are concerned about well-being.  Second, as was 
discussed previously, well-being cannot necessarily be measured using economic 
indicators alone.  Third, SWB is positively correlated with other beneficial 
outcomes, for example, happy individuals are healthier and more productive at 
work than are unhappy individuals (Diener and Seligman, 2008).  Fourth, this 
study enables one to consider a potential ethical concern: was welfare “fixed” at 
the expense of a subpopulation—single mothers—that already reported below 
average happiness. 
Further, this investigation appears feasible.  A growing number of 
economists have been using happiness data in their research (Kahneman and 
Kreuger, 2006).  Such data has been shown to provide information about a 
respondent’s well-being (Gruber and Mullainathan, 2005).  For example, many 
objective measures of well-being are positively correlated with self-reported 
happiness.  Individuals who report being happier are rated to be happier by others 
(spouses, family members, friends, and associates); absent from work less; more 
optimistic about the future; more energetic, flexible, and creative; and less likely 
to need psychological counseling (Frey and Stutzer, 2002).  Moreover, Krueger 
and Schkade (2008) report that the reliability of SWB data is high enough to 
warrant its use in across-group comparisons. 
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Two recent papers have started to explore the effect of welfare and tax 
policy changes on SWB.  Gregg et al (2009) examine the impact of a series of 
welfare and tax policy changes in the United Kingdom (U.K.) that were intended 
to help low-income families with children.  The changes included tax credits for 
low-income working families, active welfare case management, welfare-to-work 
programs, and increased welfare benefits.  In contrast to the changes in the U.S., 
the changes in the U.K. did not include punitive sanctions for failing to comply 
with the welfare-to-work program requirements.  The outcomes examined include 
those that one would typically find in such research, for example, employment, as 
well as SWB.  The authors find that the changes significantly increased self-
reported life satisfaction and mental health.  In a working paper,  Herbst (2010) 
examines the effect of welfare reform on SWB.  To do so, the author uses across-
state variation in the timing of waiver reforms and PRWORA implementation and 
an alternative dataset, the DDB Needham Life Style Survey (the GSS—and its 
self-reported happiness measure—are the most commonly used data for studying 
SWB in the U.S.).  The Life Style Survey does not include a self-reported 
happiness question but does include a self-reported life satisfaction question as 
well as measures of physical and mental health.  Herbst finds that PRWORA 
appears to have increased SWB and that the waiver reforms had a more mixed 
impact on SWB. 
The current paper adds to the literature by studying the impact of welfare 
and tax policy changes on SWB in the U.S.  This nicely complements the existing 
literature, which examines various other outcome measures, including more 
conventional measures of well-being, such as, consumption and health. 
III. EMPIRICAL IMPLEMENTATION  
A. THE DATA 
Single mothers’ happiness is examined using the General Social Survey (GSS), a 
standard data source for studying self-reported happiness in the U.S.  The GSS was 
administered annually to approximately 1,500 individuals between 1972 and 1993 
(with the exception of 1979, 1981, and 1992) and was administered biennially to 
approximately 4,500 individuals thereafter.  The GSS is designed to include a 
representative sample of U.S. households.  The sample is created using multi-
stage area probability sampling except at the block level where quota sampling is 
used with quotas for sex, age, and employment status (GSS, 1972-2010: 
Cumulative Codebook, 2011).3  The National Opinion Research Center, which 
                                                      
3 The first stage selects primary sampling units (standard metropolitan statistical areas or non-
metropolitan counties) and is stratified by region, age, and race; the second stage selects block 
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administers the GSS, states that, “In general, the GSS samples closely resemble 
distributions reported in the Census and other authoritative sources.” 
In addition to the detailed demographic and labor market questions 
included in the GSS, there is a standard question about global happiness.  
Specifically, it asks respondents “Taken all together, how would you say things 
are these days–would you say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too 
happy?”  Since the current study is primarily focused on single mothers’ 
happiness after welfare reform, the analysis is limited to the period immediately 
preceding and succeeding PRWORA’s implementation; PRWORA was 
implemented nationwide during a 17-month period—from September 1996 to 
January 1998 (Grogger and Karoly, 2005).  Given that the GSS is administered in 
February, March, and April, the before-reform period includes data from the 
1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, and 1996 GSS and the after-reform period 
includes data from the 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006 GSS.4 
Importantly, the happiness question has remained intact during this period.  
However, there have been two changes to the survey and sampling that might 
impact self-reported happiness trends during this period: (i) surveys were 
conducted in Spanish that could not have been completed if English was the only 
language in which the survey was offered in 2006; and (ii) non-responsive sub-
sampling was introduced in 2004.  To create a consistent measure of self-reported 
happiness: (i) the surveys that were conducted in Spanish that could not have been 
completed in English are dropped; and (ii) phase weights are used with the 2004 
and 2006 GSS. 
After those over the age of 45 are dropped, there are 15,713 respondents.5  
Their average happiness is 2.19 where “not too happy” (10.9 percent of 
responses), “pretty happy” (59.2 percent of responses), and “very happy” (29.9 
percent of responses) are coded as one, two, and three, respectively [see Column 
(1) of Table I].  Respondents are likely to be high school graduates, white, in good 
or excellent health, and employed. 
groups or enumeration districts and is stratified by race and income; the third stage selects blocks 
with probabilities proportional to size; and finally, interviewers proceed along a prescribed route 
conducting face-to-face interviews until their quota is fulfilled (interviews are conducted after 3 
p.m. on weekdays and during the weekend in an attempt to limit not-at-home bias).  For additional 
details regarding the GSS sample see Appendix A of the GSS, 1972-2010: Cumulative Codebook 
(2011). 
4 As is discussed in the robustness section, the main results are robust to excluding the 1996 and 
or 1998 GSS. 
5 Respondents over the age of 45 are dropped since they are less likely to be affected by welfare 
and tax policy changes targeting poor single mothers. 
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Table I 
Demographic characteristics 
 
Variable
Subjective well-being
  Average happiness+ 2.190 (0.005) 1.963 (0.015) 2.221 (0.006) *** 2.155 (0.015) *** 2.095 (0.013) *** 2.337 (0.012) ***
  Very happy 0.299 (0.004) 0.166 (0.009) 0.317 (0.004) *** 0.259 (0.011) *** 0.220 (0.009) *** 0.397 (0.010) ***
  Pretty happy 0.592 (0.004) 0.631 (0.012) 0.587 (0.005) *** 0.637 (0.012) 0.655 (0.011) 0.542 (0.010) ***
  Not too happy 0.109 (0.003) 0.203 (0.010) 0.096 (0.003) *** 0.104 (0.008) *** 0.125 (0.007) *** 0.061 (0.005) ***
Education
  Less than high school 0.113 (0.003) 0.187 (0.187) 0.102 (0.003) *** 0.059 (0.006) *** 0.086 (0.006) *** 0.080 (0.005) ***
  High school 0.553 (0.004) 0.614 (0.011) 0.546 (0.004) *** 0.495 (0.012) *** 0.544 (0.010) *** 0.575 (0.009) ***
  Some college 0.083 (0.002) 0.094 (0.007) 0.082 (0.002) * 0.077 (0.006) * 0.085 (0.006) 0.089 (0.005)
  College 0.182 (0.003) 0.081 (0.006) 0.196 (0.003) *** 0.287 (0.011) *** 0.215 (0.009) *** 0.195 (0.008) ***
  More than college 0.066 (0.002) 0.022 (0.003) 0.072 (0.002) *** 0.079 (0.006) *** 0.069 (0.005) *** 0.061 (0.005) ***
Race
  Black 0.151 (0.003) 0.350 (0.011) 0.123 (0.003) *** 0.131 (0.008) *** 0.098 (0.006) *** 0.094 (0.006) ***
  White 0.768 (0.003) 0.566 (0.011) 0.797 (0.004) *** 0.791 (0.010) *** 0.821 (0.008) *** 0.829 (0.007) ***
  Other race 0.082 (0.00) 0.083 (0.006) 0.080 (0.002) 0.078 (0.007) 0.081 (0.006) 0.077 (0.005)
Health
  Poor 0.014 (0.001) 0.022 (0.003) 0.013 (0.001) *** 0.016 (0.003) 0.008 (0.002) *** 0.011 (0.002) ***
  Fair 0.096 (0.002) 0.144 (0.008) 0.090 (0.002) *** 0.087 (0.007) *** 0.092 (0.006) *** 0.082 (0.005) ***
  Good 0.358 (0.004) 0.376 (0.011) 0.356 (0.004) * 0.348 (0.012) * 0.372 (0.010) 0.348 (0.009) *
  Excellent 0.261 (0.004) 0.188 (0.009) 0.270 (0.004) *** 0.284 (0.011) *** 0.277 (0.009) *** 0.272 (0.009) ***
Employment status
  Employed 0.763 (0.003) 0.656 (0.011) 0.777 (0.004) *** 0.781 (0.010) *** 0.788 (0.009) *** 0.639 (0.009)
  Unemployed 0.036 (0.002) 0.043 (0.005) 0.035 (0.002) 0.038 (0.005) 0.054 (0.005) 0.011 (0.002) ***
Other
  Age 32.80 (0.060) 32.98 (0.159) 32.75 (0.065) 29.10 (0.179) *** 29.35 (0.152) *** 34.68 (0.116) ***
  Number of children residing in household 1.005 (0.010) 1.914 (0.024) 0.878 (0.010) *** 0.000 (0.000) *** 0.000 (0.000) *** 2.048 (0.019) ***
  Family income (in 1986 dollars) $29,536 (237) $14,342 (343) $31,605 (262) *** $21,127 (572) *** $25,015 (578) *** $38,880 (607) ***
  Female 0.549 (0.004) 1.000 (0.000) 0.486 (0.004) *** 1.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) *** 1.000 (0.000)
  Single 0.527 (0.004) 1.000 (0.000) 0.464 (0.004) *** 1.000 (0.000) 1.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) ***
  Observations++
*, **, and *** signify that the mean is significantly different than the mean for single mothers with a p-value < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
+ where 1 = "not too happy," 2 = "pretty happy," and 3 = "very happy."
++ happiness data is missing for approximately 15% of respondents, health status is missing for approximately 25% of respondents, and parental status is missing for 
approximately 1% of respondents.
2,352
Married           
Mothers           
(6)
2,829
All              
(1)
15,713 1,942
Single           
Mothers         
(2)
All except          
Single Mothers      
(3)
13,588
Single             
Childless Women    
(4)
1,775
Single             
Childless Men       
(5)
 
 
 
B. THE UNHAPPINESS OF SINGLE MOTHERS 
Single mothers are an unhappy group.  Their average happiness is 1.96, which is 
0.26 happiness points less than the average for “non-single-mothers” (all 
respondents except single mothers).  This happiness gap is the result of being less 
likely to report high levels of happiness and more likely to report low levels of 
happiness.  In particular, single mothers are 15 percentage points less likely to 
report being “very happy” and 11 percentage points more likely to report being 
“not too happy” than are non-single-mothers [compare Columns (2) and (3) of 
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Table I].  A difference of means test reveals that each of these differences is 
statistically significant.  Moreover, the happiness gap is quite large.  For example, 
the gap is equivalent to the decrease in average happiness that would be generated 
by a ten plus percentage point increase in the unemployment rate (Stevenson and 
Wolfers, 2009). 
The happiness gap is perhaps not surprising given single mothers’ 
demographic characteristics.  That is, single mothers are significantly more likely 
to have characteristics associated with low levels of happiness (for a discussion of 
characteristics that are associated with low levels of happiness see Frey and 
Stutzer, 2002).  For example, single mothers are significantly more likely to be 
nonwhite, single, and in poor or fair health than are non-single-mothers; their 
average family income is also half that of non-single-mothers.  To test whether 
one can eliminate the happiness gap by controlling for single mothers’ 
demographic characteristics, an equation of the following form is estimated: 
iiii XSMHappiness      (1) 
where SMi is a dummy variable that equals one if individual i is a single mother 
and zero otherwise, and Xi is a vector of demographic characteristics for 
individual i including gender, age, race, native born, marital status, education, 
self-reported health, income, and region.6  Equation (1) is estimated using an 
ordered probit.7 
Estimating equation (1) without covariates, the coefficient on SM is 
negative, large, and highly statistically significant [see Column (1) of Table II].  
This indicates that single mothers are significantly less happy than non-single-
mothers.  Adding controls for demographic characteristics that are exogenous 
(gender, age, race, and native born) as well as for region and year do not affect the 
results [see Columns (2) and (3) of Table II]. 
6 To be identified as a single mother in this study, a respondent has to (i) be female and single 
(widowed, divorced, separated, or never married), (ii) have children, and (iii) report that at least 
one child ages 17 or under lives in the household. 
7 Some researchers who study SWB trends cluster the observations by year when calculating 
standard errors, for example, Stevenson and Wolfers (2009).  The results are robust to doing so. 
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Table II 
Coefficients from estimating equation (1) 
 
Variables
Single mother                                                      -0.4838 (0.0301) *** -0.5046 (0.0331) *** -0.5046 (0.0332) *** -0.0558 (0.0390)
Female 0.1555 (0.0216) *** 0.1567 (0.0216) *** 0.0761 (0.0223) ***
Age (reference group is between 28 and 36 years old)
  < 28 years old -0.1129 (0.0251) *** -0.1186 (0.0252) *** 0.0453 (0.0283)
  > 36 years old -0.0792 (0.0239) *** -0.0810 (0.0240) *** -0.0831 (0.0248) ***
Race (reference group is white)
  Black -0.2964 (0.0304) *** -0.3100 (0.0310) *** -0.2032 (0.0328) ***
  Other -0.1485 (0.0424) *** -0.1425 (0.0430) *** -0.0698 (0.0443)
Not native born -0.0116 (0.0398) -0.0091 (0.0401) -0.0539 (0.0413)
Marital status (reference group is married)
  Widowed -0.4865 (0.1140) ***
  Divorced -0.4905 (0.0350) ***
  Separated -0.6982 (0.0591) ***
  Never married -0.4499 (0.0276) ***
Education (reference group is some college)
  Less than high school -0.1821 (0.0357) ***
  High school -0.0915 (0.0263) ***
  College 0.0582 (0.0322) *
  More than college 0.0332 (0.0368)
Health (reference group is good health)
  Poor health -0.5408 (0.1043) ***
  Fair health -0.3972 (0.0370) ***
  Excellent health 0.4107 (0.0268) ***
Log real income 0.0876 (0.0131) ***
Region and year dummies
Observations
standard errors in parenthesis.
*, **, and *** signify that the coefficient is significantly different than zero with a p-value < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Yes
Ordered            
probit              
(4)
Yes
Ordered            
probit              
(3)
Ordered            
probit              
(1)
Ordered            
probit              
(2)
No No
13,296 13,296 13,296 13,296
 
 
 
The results materially change, however, when one adds controls for 
demographic characteristics that are not exogenous (marital status, education, 
self-reported health, and income).8  Now, the coefficient on SM is 
indistinguishable from zero [see Column (4) of Table II].  Thus, it appears that the 
unhappiness of single mothers can be explained by life circumstances.  The 
coefficients on income, marital status, and health indicate that low-income, being 
single, and being in poor or fair health are each associated with low levels of 
happiness.  Care must be taken, however, when interpreting this result, since 
education, health, income, and marital status are not exogenous.  Thus, one should 
                                                      
8 This distinction between exogenous and endogenous demographic characteristics follows the 
approach used by Stevenson and Wolfers (2009). 
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not claim that these life circumstances cause single mothers to be unhappy or vice 
versa. 
C. THE IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY: DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATOR 
Given that the welfare and tax policy changes target single mothers, this research 
focuses on their SWB.  Specifically, the “first difference” is the change in 
happiness of single mothers before and after PRWORA.  Identifying those likely 
to be affected by welfare and tax policy changes based on demographic 
characteristics is an approach that was pioneered two decades ago by Ellwood and 
Bane (1985) and has been used repeatedly since (Gruber and Mullainathan, 2005).  
This approach is required since survey respondents were not asked about their 
participation in programs that target single mothers.  Further, it has two distinct 
advantages over directly identifying beneficiaries of such programs.  First, it 
eliminates any concerns one might have regarding endogeneity between 
happiness and participation in such programs.  Second, it captures both the 
“entry” and “exit” effects of the welfare and tax policy changes.  For example, the 
same single mother might have chosen to receive welfare prior to PRWORA but 
not after, perhaps, due to the work requirement.  The impact of the changes on 
such “non-entrants” will be captured in the first difference.  If beneficiaries were 
identified directly, however, the impact on non-entrants would not be captured.9 
Causation cannot be demonstrated using the first difference alone, since 
there are numerous alternate explanations for any observed difference.  To isolate 
the impact of the welfare and tax policy changes, comparison groups must be 
used.  For a comparison group to effectively control for underlying trends in 
SWB, members must share some characteristics with single mothers, but must not 
be affected by the welfare and tax policy changes.  Three comparison groups are 
used: single childless women, single childless men, and married mothers.  While 
none of the comparison groups is perfect, each appears to satisfy—at least 
partially—the criterion and has been used previously (Bitler and Hoynes, 2007).10 
9 For a discussion of entry and exit effects see Moffitt (1996). 
10 In addition to controlling for underlying trends in SWB, the comparison groups should also 
help control for local economic conditions (the analysis does not directly control for them), since 
men and women’s labor market outcomes are roughly equally sensitive to local economic 
conditions and business cycles (Hoynes, 1999).  Further, less-educated individuals across all 
groups are more sensitive than are more-educated individuals; and both less-educated men and 
women are highly sensitive to local economic conditions and business cycles.  Thus, single 
childless men should be a valid comparison group.  In contrast, highly-educated single mothers are 
not a valid comparison group (even though they have been used previously), as highly-educated 
women are significantly less sensitive to local economic conditions and business cycles than are 
less-educated women. 
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Specifically, the “second difference” is the change in happiness of 
members of the comparison group before and after the reforms; thus, the 
Difference-in-Difference (DD) estimator is: 
 
)(
)(
GroupComparison
Before
GroupComparison
After
ersSingleMoth
Before
ersSingleMoth
Aftert
HappinessHappiness
HappinessHappiness


 (2) 
 
For the DD estimator to be unbiased two identifying assumptions are necessary.  
First, there are no underlying trends in happiness that differ between single 
mothers and members of the comparison groups.  Second, there are no additional 
contemporaneous shocks, other than the welfare and tax policy changes, to the 
happiness of single mothers or members of the comparison groups during the 
period of study.  It should be noted that DD estimators cannot identify individual 
policy effects when more than one policy is changed contemporaneously.  Thus, 
the DD estimator will capture the combined impact of the package of welfare and 
tax policy changes.11  The validity of the two identifying assumptions is discussed 
in the results section. 
Two-by-two DD estimators are commonly estimated using a regression of 
the following form: 
 
iiii
SMAfter
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

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
 )*(           
  (3) 
 
where Afteri is an after-reform dummy variable that equals one if individual i 
completed the survey in the after-reform period and zero otherwise; and SMi and 
Xi are defined as before.  The coefficient SMAfter is the DD estimator.  Donald 
and Lang (2007), however, show that the standard errors from estimating such an 
equation can be negatively biased due to common group effects.  Furthermore, 
they show that this is the case even if a researcher uses one of three standard 
techniques to control for common group effects, for example, clustering the 
observations when calculating the standard errors. 
                                                      
11 This is a known weakness of two-by-two DD estimators.  To isolate the effect of welfare 
reform from the effect of the other welfare and tax policy changes discussed in the background 
section of the paper, a researcher could use cross-state variance in welfare-reform implementation 
dates (for example, Bitler et al, 2005).  The GSS, however, does not contain enough observations 
to conduct such an analysis.  There are only 935 single mothers in the 1990s in the GSS; that is 
less than two observations per year per state. 
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Following Donald and Lang (2007), the DD estimators in this paper are 
computed using a two-step procedure, which Donald and Lang illustrate results in 
an efficient estimator.  In the first step, an equation of the following form is 
estimated: 
ii
iii
iiiiiii
X
YYY
YSMYSMYSMHappiness






                       
                       06,0690,9089,89
06,0689,8988,88


(4) 
where Yi,t is a year dummy variable that equals one if individual i completed the 
survey in year t and zero otherwise; Xi is a vector of demographic characteristics 
for individual i including gender, age, race, native born, marital status, education, 
and region; and SMi is defined as before.12  The coefficient t is the happiness 
gap estimator for year t, that is, the difference in happiness between single 
mothers and members of the comparison group in year t.  The 1988 year-effect is 
dropped to avoid perfect collinearity and is captured in the constant. 
In the second step, the happiness gap estimators are regressed on a 
constant and an after-reform dummy variable.  That is, an equation of the 
following form is estimated: 
tt After 10         (5) 
where Aftert is an after-reform dummy variable that equals one if the year t is in 
the after-reform period and zero otherwise, and t  are the happiness gap 
estimators from step one; there are 12 happiness gap estimators ( t ), one per 
GSS wave used.  The coefficient 1 is the DD estimator.  Equations (4) and (5) are 
estimated using ordered probit and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), respectively. 
IV. RESULTS 
A. FIRST STEP: HAPPINESS GAP ESTIMATORS 
Estimating equation (4) with the first comparison group—single childless 
women—one finds that all the happiness gap estimators are negative, confirming 
12 Income is not used as a covariate because it is likely affected by the welfare and tax policy 
changes.  Self-reported health is not used as a covariate because it is a measure of subjective well-
being. 
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that single mothers are less happy, on average, than single childless women in 
each year.  As illustrated in Figure I, this holds regardless of which covariates are 
used in the analysis.  Moreover, Figure I appears to illustrate that the happiness 
gap estimators are less negative, on average, after 1997 than before.  If this were 
the case, it would indicate that single mothers are happier after the reforms 
relative to single childless women.  The second step of the two-step procedure 
will test whether this is the case. 
 
 
Figure I 
The happiness gap estimators from estimating equation (4) with single childless 
women as the comparison group 
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Figure II is analogous to Figure I except that the second comparison group 
is used—single childless men.  Again, it appears that the happiness gap estimators 
are smaller after 1997.  Finally, Figure III illustrates the happiness gap estimators 
when the third comparison group is used—married mothers.  Here, the pattern of 
happiness gap estimators is less clear.  In particular, the happiness gap estimators 
between 1988 and 1994 vary dramatically from year to year.  However, between 
1998 and 2004—the years immediately succeeding the reforms—there is a clear 
pattern of increasing happiness among single mothers relative to married mothers. 
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Figure II 
The happiness gap estimators from estimating equation (4) with single childless 
men as the comparison group 
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Figure III 
The happiness gap estimators from estimating equation (4) with married mothers 
as the comparison group 
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Finally, examining other coefficients from estimating equation (4), the 
results are unsurprising.  Table III presents the results of estimating equation (4) 
with single childless women as the comparison group.  The results indicate that 
being black, non-native, and less educated are each associated with being less 
happy. 
 
 
Table III 
Other coefficients from estimating equation (4) with single childless women as 
the comparison group 
 
Variables
Age (reference group is between 28 and 36 years old)
  < 28 years old 0.0504 (0.0500) 0.0888 (0.0522) *
  > 36 years old -0.0630 (0.0527) -0.0865 (0.0542)
Race (reference group is white)
  Black -0.1632 (0.0526) *** -0.1344 (0.0569) **
  Other -0.1057 (0.0833) -0.0877 (0.0848)
Not native born -0.1975 (0.0904) ** -0.1817 (0.0924) **
Marital status (reference group is widowed)
  Divorced 0.0035 (0.1576)
  Separated -0.1477 (0.1670)
  Never married -0.0442 (0.1586)
Education (reference group is less than high school)
  High school 0.1275 (0.0714) *
  Some college 0.1837 (0.0705) ***
  College 0.3191 (0.0839) ***
  More than college 0.3190 (0.0894) ***
Region and year dummies
Observations
standard errors in parenthesis.
Ordered            
probit              
(1)
Ordered            
probit              
(2)
*, **, and *** signify that the coefficient is significantly different than zero with a p-value < 
0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
3,182 3,182
No No
 
 
 
B. SECOND STEP: DD ESTIMATORS 
Estimating equation (5) with the first comparison group—single childless 
women—one finds that the DD estimators are positive and highly statistically 
significant.  The positive sign indicates that single mothers’ happiness increased 
after the reforms relative to single childless women.  This results hold regardless 
of which covariates are used in the analysis [see Columns (1) to (3) of Panel A in 
Table IV].  To assess the magnitude of the observed effect, equation (4) is re-
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estimated using OLS.  Now the happiness gap estimators can be roughly 
interpreted as being measured in happiness points.13  Re-estimating equation (5) 
with these happiness gap estimators, the DD estimator ranges from 0.079 to 0.088 
depending on which covariates are used.  This indicates that single mothers’ 
happiness increased by roughly 0.08 happiness points after the reforms relative to 
single childless women.  This increase is almost half the size of the happiness gap 
between single mothers and single childless women, 0.19, over the study period. 
Table IV 
DD estimators from estimating equation (5) with single childless women children 
as the comparison group 
The observed increase in single mothers’ happiness could have been 
caused by an increase in reports of being “very happy,” a decrease in reports of 
13 This interpretation is “rough” since the happiness measure is ordinal. 
Panel A: unrestricted sample
0.1675 *** 0.1713 *** 0.1544 *** 0.2255 ** 0.2301 ** 0.2223 * -0.1182 -0.1131 -0.0832
(0.047) (0.049) (0.046) (0.098) (0.101) (0.101) (0.082) (0.079) (0.073)
{0.086} *** {0.088} *** {0.079} *** {0.047} ** {0.050} ** {0.050} * -{0.038} -{0.035} -{0.023}
First-stage observations
Panel B: sample restricted to respondents who completed high school (at most)
0.2275 0.2363 0.2286 0.2316 0.2436 0.2427 -0.7117 -0.7983 -0.8594
(0.137) (0.149) (0.152) (0.178) (0.189) (0.186) (0.689) (0.794) (0.900)
{0.121} {0.124} {0.120} {0.040} {0.042} {0.041} -{0.161} -{0.165} -{0.158}
First-stage observations
Panel C: sample restricted to respondents who did not complete high school
0.2475 0.2391 0.2297 -1.3643 -1.3784 -1.4057 -1.9066 -2.7130 -2.7077
(0.409) (0.423) (0.444) (1.454) (1.465) (2.385) (1.253) (1.882) (1.890)
{0.134} {0.127} {0.116} -{0.307} -{0.301} -{0.294} -{0.337} -{0.351} -{0.336}
First-stage observations
Control variables
Age, gender, native-born, 
and race
Education, marital status, 
and region
standard errors in parenthesis; average "happiness points" in brackets in Columns (1) - (3) and average marginal effects in brackets in columns (4) - (9)
*, **, and *** signify that the coefficient is significantly different than zero with a p-value < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
DD estimator
12
Probit        
(not too happy) 
(8)
Probit        
(not too happy) 
(9)
Ordered       
probit         
(happy)       
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Ordered       
probit         
(happy)       
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Ordered       
probit         
(happy)       
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12 12
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1212 12
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being “not too happy,” or both.  To investigate, equation (4) is estimated using a 
probit regression in which the dependent variable indicates whether a respondent 
reports being “very happy” or “not too happy.”  Then the resulting “very happy” 
or “not too happy” gap estimators are used when estimating equation (5).  The 
“very happy” DD estimators are positive and statistically significant, indicating 
that single mothers became significantly more likely to report being “very happy” 
after the reforms relative to single childless women.  Again, this result is 
consistent regardless of which covariates are used [see Columns (4) to (6) of 
Panel A in Table IV].  Calculating the marginal effects for the “very happy” gap 
estimators, and then using these when estimating equation (5), it appears that 
single mothers became approximately 5 percentage points more likely to report 
being “very happy” after the reforms relative to single childless women.  This is a 
30 percent increase relative to the percent of single mothers who report being 
“very happy” over the study period (5 percent / 16.6 percent).  Finally, the “not 
too happy” DD estimators are negative but not statistically significant, suggesting 
that single mothers became less likely to report being “not too happy” after the 
reforms relative to single childless women [see Columns (7) to (9) of Panel A in 
Table IV].  In summary, it appears that the increase in single mothers’ happiness 
is evident at each end of the happiness distribution. 
Switching to the second comparison group—single childless men—one 
finds further evidence that single mothers’ happiness increased after the reforms.  
Specifically, the DD estimators are all positive and statistically significant, the 
“not too happy” DD estimators are all negative and statistically significant, and 
the “very happy” DD estimators are all positive but generally not statistically 
significant [see Columns (1) to (9) of Panel A in Table V].  These results indicate 
that single mothers’ happiness increased after welfare reform relative to single 
childless men, and that the increase is evident at each end of the happiness 
distribution.  Furthermore, the magnitude of the effect appears similar regardless 
of whether one uses single childless women or men as the comparison group.  
In an attempt to focus the analysis on those single mothers who are most 
likely to be affected by the welfare and tax policy changes, the sample is 
restricted, first, to respondents who have at most completed high school (≤ 12 
years of education) and, second, to respondents who did not complete high school 
(≤ 11 years of education).  These restrictions should incrementally increase the 
likelihood that single mothers in the sample were affected by the welfare and tax 
policy changes, since education is a proxy for earning potential and eligibility for 
the programs in question is restricted to those with low-income.14 
                                                      
14 Similar restrictions have been used in the literature (for example, Kaestner and Tarlov, 2006).  
Restricting the sample by income is not appropriate as the reforms presumably affected the income 
of poor single mothers. 
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Estimating equations (4) and (5) with the restricted samples, the DD 
estimators generally increase in magnitude as the restriction on education 
becomes stronger.  This is the pattern one would expect if the welfare and tax 
policy changes caused the increase in happiness, since less educated single 
mothers are presumably more likely to be affected by the welfare and tax policy 
changes.  This pattern is clearest and most consistent when single childless men 
are used as the comparison group.  In this case, all the DD estimators increase 
monotonically as the restriction becomes stronger [compare Panels A, B, and C in 
Table V].  For example, the DD estimator grows from 0.1945 to 0.3321, and 
finally to 0.5039, as the restriction on the sample is strengthened [see Column 
(3)].  Measured roughly in happiness points, the DD estimators using the most 
restricted sample implies that single mothers’ happiness increased by 
approximately 0.28 happiness points after welfare reform relative to single 
childless men. 
Table V 
DD estimators from estimating equation (5) with single childless men children as 
the comparison group 
Panel A: unrestricted sample
0.2042 ** 0.2102 ** 0.1945 ** 0.1948 * 0.1934 0.1852 -0.2715 ** -0.2795 ** -0.2663 **
(0.072) (0.075) (0.080) (0.107) (0.109) (0.117) (0.096) (0.091) (0.089)
{0.104} ** {0.075} ** {0.065} * {0.047} * {0.086} ** {0.088} ** -{0.081} ** -{0.059} ** -{0.073} **
First-stage observations
Panel B: sample restricted to respondents who completed high school (at most)
0.3270 ** 0.3334 ** 0.3321 ** 0.2355 0.2329 0.2385 -0.4817 *** -0.4926 *** -0.4855 ***
(0.117) (0.118) (0.115) (0.202) (0.203) (0.200) (0.124) (0.123) (0.124)
{0.174} ** {0.205} ** {0.204} ** {0.054} {0.078} {0.078} -{0.157} *** -{0.148} *** -{0.154} ***
First-stage observations
Panel C: sample restricted to respondents who did not complete high school
0.5198 ** 0.5259 ** 0.5039 * 0.4261 0.4278 0.3802 -0.5829 * -0.5827 * -0.6024 *
(0.221) (0.223) (0.232) (0.354) (0.355) (0.365) (0.296) (0.294) (0.300)
{0.293} ** {0.287} * {0.279} * {0.080} {0.072} {0.051} -{0.210} * -{0.085} -{0.103}
First-stage observations
Control variables
Age, gender, native-born, 
and race
Education, marital status, 
and region
standard errors in parenthesis; "happiness points" in brackets in Columns (1) - (3) and marginal effects in brackets in columns (4) - (9)
*, **, and *** signify that the coefficient is significantly different than zero with a p-value < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
No No YesNo
1212
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Yes
12
Yes
12
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12 12
No Yes Yes
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The pattern is also apparent using single childless women as the 
comparison group.  The DD estimators increase monotonically as the restriction is 
strengthened.  However, the DD estimators increase by very little switching from 
the first to the second restriction [compare Columns (1) to (3) of Panels B and C 
in Table IV].  Interestingly, the “very happy” DD estimators become negative and 
large (but not statistically significant) when the second restriction is used; in 
contrast, the “not too happy” DD estimators follow the “expected” pattern, 
becoming more negative when the second restriction is used [compare Columns 
(4) to (9) of Panels B and C in Table IV].  This suggests that single mothers who 
did not complete high school became less likely to report being “very happy” and 
“not too happy” after the reforms relative to single childless women. 
Finally, when using the third comparison group—married mothers—the 
“standard” results do not emerge.  Specifically, the DD estimators are 
approximately zero when the unrestricted sample is used [see columns (1) to (3) 
of Panel A in Table VI].  This is not surprising given the happiness gap estimators 
illustrated in Figure III and discussed previously.  Specifically, the happiness gap 
estimators vary dramatically between 1988 and 1994.  In contrast, single mothers’ 
happiness appears to have increased relative to married mothers between 1998 
and 2004, the six years immediately following PRWORA.  Further, the DD 
estimators grow in size as the restriction on education is strengthened.  When the 
sample is restricted to respondents who did not complete high school, the DD 
estimators are all large and positive but not statistically significant, suggesting 
that less-educated single mothers’ happiness increased after welfare reform 
relative to less-educated married mothers [see columns (1) to (3) of Panel C in 
Table VI]. 
C. ROBUSTNESS 
To further test the robustness of the results, and to examine the validity of the two 
identifying assumptions, the following three checks are performed: First, data 
collected in close proximity to the implementation of PRWORA is dropped.  
Specifically, the data from the 1996 GSS is dropped, then the data from the 1998 
GSS is dropped, and finally, data from both the 1996 and 1998 GSS are dropped.  
The DD estimators are unaffected; their sign, magnitude, and statistical 
significance remain largely unchanged.  Appendix Table AI presents the DD 
estimators when all covariates are used; the results are largely the same if no 
covariates or only the exogenous covariates are used.  Thus, the results are not 
dependent on the exact definition of the before- and after-reform periods. 
Second, the happiness gap estimators are not increasing in the before-
reform period.  Visual inspection of Figures I to III appears to confirm this.  To 
formally test whether this is the case, the happiness gap estimators are regressed 
on a time trend variable (=year of survey – 1988) for the before-reform period, 
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1988 - 1996.  All time trend coefficients are indistinguishable from zero and half 
have a negative sign.  Appendix Table AII presents the time trend coefficients.  
Thus, there is no indication that single mothers’ happiness is increasing or 
decreasing in the before-reform period relative to each comparison group.  Thus, 
it appears that the first identifying assumption is likely to hold—that there are no 
underlying trends in happiness that differ between single mothers and members of 
the comparison groups. 
Table VI 
DD estimators from estimating equation (5) with single childless women children 
as the comparison group 
Lastly, to confirm the validity of the second identifying assumption—that 
there are no additional contemporaneous happiness shocks, other than the welfare 
and tax policy changes, that differ between single mothers and members of the 
comparison groups—the following assertions must hold: (i) that the welfare and 
tax policy changes likely caused the observed increase in happiness, and (ii) that 
Panel A: unrestricted sample
-0.0071 0.0062 0.0015 0.0689 0.0817 0.0631 0.1318 0.1273 0.1335
(0.082) (0.086) (0.092) (0.113) (0.117) (0.120) (0.136) (0.137) (0.144)
-{0.002} {0.005} -{0.008} {0.009} {0.013} {0.003} {0.050} {0.046} {0.014}
First-stage observations
Panel B: sample restricted to respondents who completed high school (at most)
0.0215 0.0324 0.0357 0.0883 0.1004 0.0901 0.0663 0.0663 0.0568
(0.068) (0.071) (0.067) (0.126) (0.131) (0.128) (0.125) (0.127) (0.129)
{0.012} {0.018} {0.009} {0.018} {0.020} {0.003} {0.024} {0.023} {0.015}
First-stage observations
Panel C: sample restricted to respondents who did not complete high school
0.3220 0.2898 0.3092 0.8904 0.8314 0.7874 -0.4004 -0.3991 -0.4533
(0.283) (0.278) (0.288) (0.810) (0.792) (0.786) (0.307) (0.303) (0.309)
{0.183} {0.164} {0.000} {0.177} {0.167} -{0.008} -{0.108} -{0.107} -{0.049}
First-stage observations
Control variables
Age, gender, native-born, 
and race
Education, marital status, 
and region
standard errors in parenthesis; "happiness points" in brackets in Columns (1) - (3) and marginal effects in brackets in columns (4) - (9)
*, **, and *** signify that the coefficient is significantly different than zero with a p-value < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
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there are no other plausible explanations for the increase.  Three facts help 
corroborate the first assertion.  First, PWRORA was implemented nationwide 
between September 1996 and January 1998.  This corresponds to the timing of the 
observed increase in happiness.  Further, the results are robust to dropping the 
1996 and or 1998 GSS, and there is no evidence that single mothers’ happiness 
was increasing between 1988 and 1996 relative to each comparison group.  
Second, the magnitude of the DD estimator increases when the sample is 
restricted to less-educated respondents.  This is the pattern one would expect if the 
observed increase in happiness is caused by the welfare and tax policy changes, 
since less-educated single mothers are more likely to be affected by the changes.  
Third, the DD estimators are largely consistent across three mutually exclusive 
comparison groups.  This implies that single mothers’ happiness must have 
increased after the reforms relative to each comparison group.  Since members of 
each comparison group are less likely to be affected by the welfare and tax policy 
changes than are single mothers, the changes are a likely cause for the observed 
increase in happiness.  Finally, in terms of the second assertion, there were no 
additional national policy changes—other than the discussed welfare and tax 
policy changes—that targeted poor single mothers during this period. 
V. DISCUSSION 
The results appear to indicate that the package of welfare and tax policies changes 
targeting single mothers, and generally promoting work, increased single 
mothers’ happiness.  Further, there is no evidence to suggest that the changes 
reduced happiness.  The observed increase in happiness appears to result from 
both an increase in single mothers reporting a high level of happiness (“very 
happy”) and a decrease in single mothers reporting a low level of happiness (“not 
too happy”).  The magnitude of the effect appears quite large.  The average of the 
DD estimators (measured roughly in happiness points) is 0.11 (across all 
comparison groups, restrictions on education, and sets of covariates).  This is over 
a third of the happiness gap between single mothers and all other respondents. 
Interestingly, these results appear to indicate that for single mothers the 
cost of working in terms of lost leisure time and additional life stressors was more 
than offset by the benefits.  Recall that Meyer and Sullivan (2008) estimate that 
single mothers’ consumption increased by an average of three dollars for each 
hour of lost leisure time.  Thus, the current results appear to indicate that the value 
of an hour of leisure is less than three dollars, or that there must be positive non-
pecuniary benefits of working.  The latter may at first appear surprising given 
conventional economic theory.  However, if one believes the findings from 
happiness research, it is not surprising.  For example, it has been shown that 
individuals take pleasure from working even in mundane jobs, that in many cases 
21
Ifcher: The Happiness of Single Mothers after Welfare Reform
Published by De Gruyter, 2011
Brought to you by | Santa Clara University
Authenticated
Download Date | 6/2/15 7:25 PM
work activities are more enjoyable than leisure activities, and that unemployment 
adversely affects well-being (Diener and Seligman, 2008).  Apparently, these 
finding may also hold for single mothers. 
Further, it is important to recognize that some of the welfare and tax 
policy changes used incentives rather than penalties to promote work.  For 
example, the EITC expansion and the introduction of transitional Medicaid 
benefits should have increased the benefit, and reduced the cost, of working for 
single mothers.  Unfortunately, however, the two-by-two DD estimators used in 
this paper do not provide any information regarding the effect of individual policy 
changes; rather, they estimate the net effect of the package of welfare and tax 
policy changes.  To better understand which components of the package increased 
single mothers’ happiness, it would be useful in the future to identify the effect of 
individual policy changes on SWB. 
Finally, this research adds to the literature that examines the impact of 
social welfare programs by estimating the impact of the welfare and tax policy 
changes on self-reported happiness, demonstrating the feasibility of incorporating 
such measures into future evaluations of social welfare programs. 
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Table AI 
DD estimators from estimating equation (5) with the 1996 and or 1998 GSS dropped 
 
Panel A: unrestricted sample
0.1544 *** 0.1638 *** 0.1325 ** 0.1419 ** 0.1945 ** 0.1761 * 0.1943 * 0.1759 0.0015 -0.0253 0.0463 0.0196
(0.046) (0.049) (0.048) (0.050) (0.080) (0.084) (0.090) (0.095) (0.092) (0.094) (0.095) (0.096)
Panel B: sample restricted to respondents who completed high school (at most)
0.2286 0.2672 0.1785 0.2171 0.3321 ** 0.3269 ** 0.3034 ** 0.2982 * 0.0357 0.0252 0.0780 0.0675
(0.152) (0.157) (0.165) (0.171) (0.115) (0.126) (0.127) (0.139) (0.067) (0.072) (0.064) (0.069)
Panel C: sample restricted to respondents who did not complete high school
0.2297 0.3274 0.1821 0.2798 0.5039 * 0.5279 * 0.4379 0.4619 0.3092 0.2963 0.3533 0.3404
(0.444) (0.467) (0.499) (0.526) (0.232) (0.251) (0.254) (0.275) (0.288) (0.313) (0.322) (0.351)
Control variables
  Age, gender, native-born, and race
  Education, marital status, and region
standard errors in parenthesis.
*, **, and *** signify that the coefficient is significantly different than zero with a p-value < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
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Table AII 
Time trend estimates for the before-reform period, 1988 - 1996 
Panel A: unrestricted sample
0.0096 0.0091 0.0076 -0.0109 -0.0101 -0.0131 -0.0071 -0.0062 -0.0075
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) -(0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025)
Panel B: sample restricted to respondents who completed high school (at most)
0.0189 0.0252 0.0211 0.0083 0.0085 0.0068 -0.0044 -0.0058 -0.0083
(0.042) (0.046) (0.047) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016)
Panel C: sample restricted to respondents who did not complete high school
-0.0924 -0.0818 -0.0896 0.0539 0.0573 0.0654 -0.0279 -0.0315 -0.0287
(0.129) (0.136) (0.141) (0.066) (0.065) (0.066) (0.035) (0.037) (0.032)
Control variables
  Age, gender, native-born, and race
  Education, marital status, and region
standard errors in parenthesis.
*, **, and *** signify that the coefficient is significantly different than zero with a p-value < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
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No
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Ordered       
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NoYes
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